Safety Evaluation and

Control Measure Design In

Offshore Process Facilities

Faisal I. Khan Paul R. Amyotte

Faculty of Engineering & Applied Department of
Science Chemical Engineering
Memorial University of Dalhousie University
Newfoundland Halifax, NS
St. John's, NF
Outline of presentation

 Risk Assessment Methodologies

 SCAP a New Methodology
 Application of SCAP to Offshore process
facility
Methodologies available for
safety evaluation and hazard
assessment
 Hazard index – Dow
index, Mond index
 Hazard and
operability (HAZOP)
study
 Failure mode effect
analysis
 What-if analysis
 Fault tree analysis
 Event tree analysis
 Consequence analysis
fkhan:

Do we need a new
methodology?
 No single methodology is able to
answer:
 What may go wrong?
 How it may go wrong?
 How likely its occurrence?
 What would be the impacts?
 What control measures would reduce its
impact and likelihood of occurrence?
A new methodology SCAP *

 S- Safety, CA- Credible Accident, and P-

Probabilistic hazard assessment
 SCAP’s objectives:
 to identify hazards in an unit/industry,
 to quantify its probability of occurrence,
 to forecast its impacts in and around the
industry,
 to suggest safety measures and then
reassess the risk incorporating suggested
control methods.
* Khan, F.I., Husain, T., & Abbasi, S.A., J of Loss Prevention in Process Industries, 15, 129-146, 2001
SCAP is developed by
integrating:
 Safety Weighted Hazard Index
(SWeHI),

 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis,

and

 Probabilistic Hazard Assessment.

 What may go
What would be Start
wrong?
the impacts?
How it may go
Hazard identification
SWeHI wrong?
Quantitative hazard Probabilistic hazard
How likely its
assessment- MCAA assessment-ASM occurrence?
Accident scenario
development Fault tree for the
envisaged scenario
Fault tree
development
What control
•MCAS
measures would
reduce its impact
Consequences
Fault tree analysis and likelihood of
analysis
•MAXCRED
•PROFAT occurrence?
Apply safety
Risk estimation measures and re-
evaluate risk

No Suggest safety
Whether risk
is in measures to control
acceptance? risk

Yes

End
 Start

Hazard identification
SWeHI

Quantitative hazard Probabilistic hazard

assessment- MCAA assessment-ASM

Accident scenario
development Fault tree for the Fault tree
•MCAS envisaged scenario development

Consequences
Fault tree analysis
analysis
•PROFAT
•MAXCRED

Apply safety
Risk estimation measures and re-
evaluate risk

No Suggest safety
Whether risk
is in measures to control
acceptance? risk

Yes

End
Safety weighted hazard
index (SWeHI) *

 It relates hazards posed by a unit

and safety measures effective on it
 It represents the radius of the area
of 50% probability of
fatality/damage

* Khan F.I., Husain, T., and Abbasi, S.A. Transaction of IChemE UK, B79, 1-16, 2001
SWeHI continued…
SWeHI = B/A
B is the quantitative measure of
the damage potential
 A represents the credits due to
control measures and safety
arrangements
 Start

Manageable units & take one unit

Identify all hazardous chemicals

Fire and explosion Toxic and Corrosive

hazards
Type of hazards hazards
presents?
Match the unit with the
Calculate G factor
predefined units
Calculate penalties
Calculate Fs factor and
different penalties
Estimate damage
Estimate damage potential potential
using Fs & penalties
Estimate B2 factor
Estimate B1 factor
B1 Maximum of B1 and B2 as B factor B2

Credits for the safety measures

Quantification of A

Quantification of SWeHI

No
All chemicals &
units checked?
Yes
Stop
Quantification of B1 (fire &
explosion hazards)
 Energy factors, Fs
 Chemical Energy
 F1 = 0.1*M * (Hc)/K

 Physical Energy

 F2 = 1.304 * 10-3*PP*V

 F3 = 1.0*10-3*1/(T+273)*(PP-VP)2*V
B1 quantification
continues
 Penalties for various parameters
 Temperature, pn1
 Pressure, pn2
 Location with respect to others, pn3
 Capacity of the unit, pn4
 Chemicals characteristics, pn5
 Degree of congestion, pn6
 External factor such as earthquake, pn7
 Vulnerability of the site, pn8
Quantification of B2 (toxic
hazard)
 B2is quantified using one core ‘G’
factor and seven penalties
G= S*m
 S is dependent on release condition,
and
 m is release rate or mass released
B2 quantification
continues
 Seven penalties are:
 Operating temperature, pnr1
 Operating pressure, pnr2

 Vapor density, pnr3

 Chemical characteristics, pnr4

 Population density of the area, pnr5

 Site characteristics, pnr6 and pnr7

Quantification of A
A incorporates the quantification of
the various control measures
 A is classified in two groups
 Measures to control the damage
potential
 Measures to reduce the frequency of
occurrence
Ranking of Hazard
SWeHI = Maximum (B1 or B2)/A
SWeHI
0 Not hazardous

1 Less hazardous

5 Moderately hazardous

10 Hazardous

20 Highly hazardous
 Start

Hazard identification
SWeHI

Quantitative hazard Probabilistic hazard

assessment- MCAA assessment-ASM

Accident scenario
development Fault tree for the Fault tree
•MCAS envisaged scenario development

Consequences
Fault tree analysis
analysis
•PROFAT
•MAXCRED

Apply safety
Risk estimation measures and re-
evaluate risk

No Suggest safety
Whether risk
is in measures to control
acceptance? risk

Yes

End
Maximum credible
accident analysis (MCAA)
 Accident scenario forecasting
 Maximum credible accident scenario
(MCAS)
 Damage estimation for envisaged
accident scenario
 MAXCRED software
Maximum credible
accident scenario *

 The credible accident is defined as ‘the

accident that is within the realm of
possibility (i.e., probability higher than
1*e-06 /yr) and has a propensity to cause
significant damage (at least one
fatality)’.

* Khan F.I., Chemical Engineering Progress (AIChE, USA), November, 55-67, 2001
 Take one unit
Develop all plausible accident scenarios

Consider one accident scenario

Toxic and/or
Flammable corrosive
Is the chemical
flammable &/or toxic?

Calculate factor A Calculate factor BB

Calculate factor B
Calculate factor CC
Calculate factor C

Calculate credibility Calculate credibility

factor L1 factor L2
Calculate total credibility factor L

Classify credibility of the scenario

No
Is it credible?
Yes
List the scenario

No Are all units over?

Yes
Short list the most credible accident
scenarios
Delineation of maximum
credible accident
scenarios
0.0
 Credibilityof accident Uncertainty
zone

scenario is delineated 0.2

using: Credibility
zone

 L1 (fire and explosion) 0.5

 L2 (toxic release)

 L = (L12 + L22)1/2 for Maximum credibility

zone
both type of events
1.0
Damage estimation-
MAXCRED *

 MAXCRED enables simulation of

accidents and estimation of their
damage potential

* Khan, F.I., and Abbasi, S.A., Environment Modelling and Software, 14, 11-25, 1999
Models in MAXCRED
 Fire  Explosion
 Pool fire  Confined vapor cloud
 Flash fire explosion
 Fire ball  Boiling liquid expanding
 Jet fire vapor cloud explosion
 Toxic release
 Vapor cloud explosion
 Heavy gases
 Light gases
 Domino effect model
 Start

Hazard identification
SWeHI

Quantitative hazard Probabilistic hazard

assessment- MCAA assessment-ASM

Accident scenario
development Fault tree for the Fault tree
•MCAS envisaged scenario development

Consequences
Fault tree analysis
analysis
•PROFAT
•MAXCRED

Apply safety
Risk estimation measures and re-
evaluate risk

No Suggest safety
Whether risk
is in measures to control
acceptance? risk

Yes

End
Analytical simulation method
(ASM) *

 Main steps:
 Fault tree development
 Boolean matrix creation

 Finding of minimum cutsets and

optimization
 Probability analysis

 Improvement index estimation

* Khan, F.I., and Abbasi, S.A., J of Hazardous Materials, 75(1), 1-27, 2000
 Start

Represent an undesired
event in terms of fault tree

Transform fault tree into

boolean matrix

Solve boolean matrix for

minimum cutsets

Optimization of cutsets Optimization

criteria

No
Is optimization
over?
Yes
Transformation of
Probabilistic analysis static probability to Probabilities
fuzzy probability
set
Improvement index
calculation

Stop
ASM Procedure
PROFAT *

 PROFAT is the software developed

based on ASM
 It is coded in C++

* Khan, F.I., and Abbasi, S.A., Process Safety Progress (AIChE, USA), 18(1), 1999
 Start

Hazard identification
SWeHI

Quantitative hazard Probabilistic hazard

assessment- MCAA assessment-ASM

Accident scenario
development Fault tree for the Fault tree
•MCAS envisaged scenario development

Consequences
Fault tree analysis
analysis
•PROFAT
•MAXCRED

Apply safety
Risk estimation measures and re-
evaluate risk

No Suggest safety
Whether risk
is in measures to control
acceptance? risk

Yes

End
Risk estimation
 Risk
= damage potential *
probability of occurrence
F
 Risk representation
 F-N Curve N
 Iso-risk contours

Risk contours over site layout

 Start

Hazard identification
SWeHI

Quantitative hazard Probabilistic hazard

assessment- MCAA assessment-ASM

Accident scenario
development Fault tree for the Fault tree
•MCAS envisaged scenario development

Consequences
Fault tree analysis
analysis
•PROFAT
•MAXCRED

Apply safety
Risk estimation measures and re-
evaluate risk

No Suggest safety
Whether risk
is in measures to control
acceptance? risk

Yes

End
Safety measures design
 Design
measures to control the
damage
 Fire resistance barrier,
 Blast resistance barrier, etc.

 Designmeasures to reduce
probability of occurrence
 Automatic shut down system,
 Safety relief valve, etc.
Re-evaluation of Risk
 Modify the fault tree
 Redo the fault tree analysis
 Re-estimate the risk
 Compare risk against acceptable
criteria
 Units for which risk could not be
brought to acceptable level,
develop
 Disaster management plan
 Emergency resource plan
Application of
SCAP
Process facility on a
fixed Offshore platform
Problem Statement*
 To design the safety
measure for process
units of a fixed
offshore platform

 The platform is
located in east coast
region of Canada
(Atlantic Canada),
Newfoundland shelf,
Canada
* Khan, F.I. et. al., J. Of Hazardous Materials , A94, 2002,1-36
Process facilities on offshore
platform

Separator 1 Compressor 1
Flash
Drum
Process
area 30m
Separator 1

Compressor 2 Drier

Offshore
platform 50m
 Fire and explosion hazard index

0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Oil pipeline

Screening limit
Results

Gas pipeline

Separator 1

Separator 2

Pump

Flash drum
Hazard identification

Drier

Compressor
Maximum credible
accident scenario
 Condensate separator
 Formation of vapor cloud due to release of
flammable gas (wet natural gas) from the
unit which on ignition causes “vapor cloud
explosion”, unreleased chemical in unit burn
as “Pool Fire”
 Compressor unit
 Continuous release of flammable gas (wet
natural gas) from compressor on ignition
cause a “jet fire”
Damage estimation:
MAXCRED results for
condensate separator
Parameters Values
___________________________________________________________________

Unit: Separator
Scenario: VCE followed by pool fire

Explosion: VCE

Total energy released by explosion (kJ) : 1.23e+07

Peak overpressure (kPa) : 320.00
Variation of overpressure in air (kPa/s) : 345.00
Shock velocity of air (m/s) : 353.00
Duration of shock wave (ms) : 8.0

Damage Radii (DR) for various degrees of damage due to

overpressure

DR for 100% complete damage (m) : 53

DR for 100% fatality or 50% complete damage (m) : 74
DR for 50% fatality or 25% complete damage (m) : 86

Fire: Pool fire

Burning area (sq.m) : 265.00

Burning rate (kg/s) : 10.00
Heat flux (kJ/sq.m) : 2654.00

Damage Radii (DR) due to thermal load

DR for 100% fatality/damage (m) : 34

DR for 50% fatality/damage (m) : 55
DR for 100% third degree of burn (m) : 69
DR for 50% third degree of burn (m) : 78
Damage estimation:
MAXCRED results for
compressor
_____________________________________________________________
Parameters Values
_____________________________________________________________

Fire : Jet Fire

Flame length (m) : 5.45

Burning rate (kg/s) : 10.0
Radiation heat flux (kJ/m2) : 1493

Damage Radii (DR) due to thermal load

DR for 100% fatality/damage (m) : 24

DR for 50% fatality/damage (m) : 35
DR for 100% third degree of burn (m) : 44
DR for 50% third degree of burn (m) : 57

_____________________________________________________________
 Vapor cloud explosion
followed by fire

OR
gate Vapor cloud Release of chemical
explosion from other units
AND gate

Basic event
Ignition source
Ignition source Chemical release
Formation of
vapor cloud

18 19
15 16 17
20 21

Leak from pipeline

Leak from
Leak from
separator 2 Excessive pressure in
valves
vessel release of
chemical

Leak from Leak from

crude oil vapor line
line
5 6 7 8 9 10
12 13 14

1 2 3 4
Fault tree for a VCE followed
by fire in condensate
 Jet fire

Ignition
Jet release Jet causing other
OR units to fail
gate

AND gate

Basic event 13 14 15
16 17

Release from Release from Release from pump

downstream upstream pipeline Release from section
pipeline compressor

3 12
4 8
1 2
9
5 11
7
10
6

Fault tree for a jet fire in compressor unit

Results of ASM
 Condensate separator unit
 The occurrence probability of the envisaged
accident is 9.474E-04 per year
 Events 18 and 20 (release from connecting pipe
and ignition due to external energy source) has
maximum (about 17% each) contribution to the
probability of the eventual accident
 High pressure in upstream pipeline, ignition due to
electric spark, release from connective vessel, and
ignition due to external fire are other important
events that are making significant
contribution to this accident
Results of ASM
 Compressor unit
 The occurrence probability of the envisaged
accident is 1.364E-02 per year
 Events, external fire causing unit to fail and release
of chemical and ignition due to of external energy
sources, have maximum contribution (about 47%)
to the probability of the eventual accident
 Ignition due to electric spark, release from pipeline,
and leak from casing and seal of compressor are
other important events that are making significant
contribution to this accident
FN curve for condensate
separator 1.00E+00

1.00E-01
Frequency of occurrence (F)

1.00E-02

1.00E-03

1.00E-04

1.00E-05
1.00 10.00 100.00
Fatalities (N)
Design of safety measures
 Separator and compressor unit
 Flame arrestor
 Cooling system

 Flammable gas detector

 Inert gas purging system

 Preventive maintenance of pumps,

pipelines and compressor
 Installation of blast barriers
 Vapor cloud explosion followed
by fire

Occurrence
Ignition
probability
Release of chemical
Formation of
vapor cloud
from other units reduced from
9.474 E-04 to
Ignition source
Jet causing
1.555E-08 /yr,
27 Ignition
other units to
fail individual risk
28
from 1.4E-02 to
21 22 23
Ignition source 2.3E-06
Jet causing
24
25 26 other units to
fail

15 16 17
18 19

Leak from
pipeline Bursting of separator 2
causing release of
Leak from chemical
Leak from
separator 2
valves

Fault tree for

Leak from
crude oil line
Leak from
vapor line Excessive condensate
pressure in vessel 14
separator after
5 6 7 8 9 10

implementing
control measures
1 2 3 4
11 12 13
 Jet fire followed with
pool fire

Occurrence
probability
Ignition
Jet release Jet fire causing
other units to fail
reduced from
1.364E-02 to
1.311E-06 /yr,
Ignition source
20 Jet fire causing
individual risk
21 22 other units to fail from 1.24E-01 to
15 16 17 1.21E-05
18 19
Release from Release from
downstream upstream Release from Release from pumps
pipeline pipeline compressor

Release from
3 Release from pump
4 compressor section 14
1 2 13

12
Fault tree for
8
9
compressor after
5
7
11 implementing
6
10 control measures
FN curve for condensate
separator 1.00E+00

1.00E-01
before safety measures
acceptance criteria
after safety measures
1.00E-02
Frequency of occurrence (F)

1.00E-03

1.00E-04

1.00E-05

1.00E-06
1.00 10.00 100.00
Fatalities (N)
Comparison of individual
risk with ALARP criteria

1.0E+01 Units
After remedial meaures
Unacceptable region

1.2E-01 1.2E-01 Before remedial measures

1.0E-01
1.4E-02
5.7E-03
1.0E-03 ALARP
Individual Risk (IR)

3.7E-04
4.2E-05
1.0E-05 1.2E-05 1.2E-05
2.3E-06
Negligible risk 5.5E-07
5.2E-07 5.2E-07
1.0E-07 Broadly acceptable region

1.0E-09

Drier
Flash
Sepa. 1

Sepa. 2

Compr. 1

Compr. 2
Thanks