Hazident

Inherent Safety Structure
PROCESS HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Using
Hazard and Operability Studies (HazOp)
Colin S. ‘Chip’ Howat Ph.D.
Kurata Thermodynamics Laboratory

Department of Chemical & Petroleum Engineering
University of Kansas
1
C. S. Howat - Hazard Identification - © 2002
Lecture: One to Two Class Periods
Title: Process Hazard Identification Using Hazard & Operability Studies
Thought: I don’t like work - no man does - but I like what is

in work - the chance to find yourself. Your own
reality - for yourself, not for others - what no other
man can ever know.
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 1902
Question: What are the implications of: ‘What you don’t

have can’t leak’ and ‘People who aren’t there
can’t be injured’?
Purpose: Introduce hazard evaluation procedures and introduce

Hazard & Operability Studies
Objective: Synthesis and Evaluation
2
A Hazard is?
Outline
• Purpose of Hazard Evaluation
• Introduction to Risk Assessment
• Types of Hazard Identification Procedures
• Focus on Two Methods
• Focus on Identification
HazOp
• Focus on Identification
Checklist
3
requires identification,
evaluation and evolution. Hazard Identification
We have discussed the steps of process synthesis in general. Again this is not
a step-by-step procedure. But it does give a rough guide to what needs to be
considered during the development of the base case, in particular, and of any
design tier, generally. The structure is given below. The focus of this talk is to
address the beginnings of Hazard Identification. Recall that the purpose of
of Inherent Safety is to reduce or eliminate the hazard. In order to do that
we need to know what the hazards are and where they exist in the process.
Process Information
Process Structure
Feed, Product, Byproduct & Waste Structure
Recycle Structure
Separation Structure
Heat Integration
Process Control Structure
4
Why did we cover inherent
safety topics before identification
and evaluation? Hazard Identification
As a refresher, the strategies that we have for inherent safety are listed below
from the previous lecture. Once we identify our hazards during synthesis and
later and once we evaluate them for risk, we can incorporate these strategies
into evolving recycle, separation, heat integration and process control structures.
Inherently Safer Processes Strategies
MINIMIZE Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances.
SUBSTITUTE Replace hazardous substances with a less hazardous ones.
MODERATE Use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous forms

of a material, or less hazardous facilities.
SIMPLIFY Use less complexity.
5
This definition will
be used in the strictest
sense ~ know and apply Hazard Identification
it.
‘A hazard is an inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the potential

for causing harm.’
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures
We need to identify HAZARDS.

HAZARDS
We need to evaluate HAZARDS against acceptable risk criteria.
We need to reduce HAZARDS when criteria aren’t meant.
The Hazard Identification Methodology which is the

focus for design is a disciplined, organized effort to
identify significant HAZARDS in the evolving process.
6
Where does hazard
identification fit in
the Inherent Safety Hazard Identification
Structure?
RISK = PROBABILITY * CONSEQUENCE
Identify the HAZARD

We are going to use Hazard and Operability Studies on a limited basis.
Evaluate the HAZARD

We are going to use Layer of Protection Analysis. This requires identifying
the scenario, identifying the layers of protection, determining the probability
and determining the consequence.
Reduce the HAZARD

We are going to use Inherent Safety Concepts to reduce the hazard where
we fail to meet the acceptable risk criteria.
For the purposes of this course, we are just beginning to use this process. We will do more extensive HazOp’s,
LOPA’s and Risk Reduction Strategies in Plant & Environmental Safety.
7
This is just the
beginning, we are
just scratching the surface. Hazard Identification
System Description
Risk Assessment
is an integral part
Hazard Identification of the design,
start-up, operation
procedure.
Scenario Identification
Event Probability Event Consequence
Our emphasis in synthesis

is to eliminate or reduce
hazard. Our focus is on Risk Determination
inherent safety. Nevertheless,
when hazards still exist in the
design, there is the potential
that they can escape and cause
harm. Once the hazard is No
identified, we attempt to Acceptable? Re-Design
identify accident or excursion System Using
scenarios so that we can Inherent Safety
determine the risk and determine
whether it is acceptable.
8
Hazard Identification
The successful Hazard Evaluation program meets the following:
• The need for risk information has been met;
• The results are of high quality and are easy for decision makers to use;
• The study has been performed with the minimum resources needed.
The selection of Hazard Evaluation program is based on the following:

• The motivation for the study and types of results needed
• The type of information available, perceived risks, characteristics
• The resource availability and analyst/management preference
9
We are going to be
focusing on HazOp.
Examples ~
• Safety Review -- Qualitative descriptions of potential safety

?
problems
• Checklist -- Written list of items to verify status of system
• Relative Ranking -- A strategy to compare systems for further study
• Preliminary Hazards Analysis -- General method to focus on system
• What-if Analysis -- Brainstorming approach concerning undesired
events
• What-if/Checklist -- Combined brainstorming/detailed list
• Hazard and Operability Study -- Systematic method to identification
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis -- Tabulate equipment failure modes
• Fault Tree Analysis -- Deductive approach from event to cause
• Event Tree Analysis -- Inductive from initiating to all outcomes
• Cause Consequence Analysis -- Combined Fault and Event Trees
• Human Reliability Analysis -- Systematic evaluation of factors affecting
personnel
10
Typical Uses ~
(Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, p.77)
11
The previous slide indicates that the

checklist procedure is applicable for
conceptual design. While this is the case
in many applications, it is geared more
toward detailed design and layers of
protection. I don’t think that it is the
So what is our focus? best application for our purposes in
Design I. However, checklists do give
insight into the exploration step.
I have included checklist information
at the end of this talk.
The identification of toxicity, high pressure and high temperature

hazards may be relatively straightforward. With that identification
you can invoke the inherent safety strategies to reduce the hazard.
Oftentimes, though, the hazard is not clearly evident. A formal
method is useful to analyze the design as it evolves. This can
be considered ‘routine operation’ in the previous table. The most
widely used method for identifying hazards is the Hazard &
Operability Study ~ HazOp, for short.
12
Hazard and Operability Studies
Hazard and Operability Analysis was developed to

identify and evaluate safety hazards in a process
plant and to identify operability problems which could
compromise a plant’s ability to meet design productivity.
The purpose is to carefully review a process or operation

in a systematic fashion to identify excursions which
could lead to undesirable consequences. This gives insight
into the hazards that are present in the plant.
The results are identified hazards and operability

problems, recommended changes and studies etc.
These are typical requirements when analyzing an existing plant or new design.
Accurate P&I’s, detailed process info, knowledge of instrumentation and
operation etc. are required. The team requires design, operation, maintenance etc.
experience.
We will be able to apply this method to our evolving

design as we prepare the base case. It will guide us in
13 selecting inherently safer strategies.
Application of this
requires discipline.
HazOp Procedure
A HazOp Guide Word is combined with a Process Parameter to
Identify:
Deviations from intended design/operation
Causes of those deviations
Identification Consequences of those deviations

is the focus!
Safeguards to prevent causes and mitigate
consequences of the deviations
Actions (recommendations) for design or

operation changes to avoid deviation
HazOp Studies do not provide insight into the probability or likelihood

of the deviation.
14
HazOp Guide Words
No or Not The complete negation of the intention

ex. No flow to reactor
Less Quantitative decrease in the intent
ex. Less flow to the reactor
More Quantitative increase in the intent
ex. More flow to the reactor
Part of Qualitative decrease in the intent
ex. Part of the reactants to the reactor
As well as Qualitative increase in the intent
ex. Cooling water in the reactor
Reverse Logical opposite of the intention
ex. Reverse flow into the reactor
Other than Complete substitution
ex. Another material besides reactants in the
reactor
Other words may be more appropriate such as sooner for other than when
considering time, higher instead of more when considering level, etc. --
Consider the intent of the words.
15
HazOp Parameters
Flow Frequency
Pressure Viscosity
Temperature Voltage
Level Information
Time Mixing
Composition Addition
pH Separation
Speed Reaction
This list is tailored to the task at hand -- not all used, more added as required.
16
HazOp Preparation
Attitude Meeting
Preparation Leadership
HazOp
Review
by Documentation Follow-up
Team
Knowledge/ Information
Experience for Study
Team’s HazOp
Experience Table
Deviation Causes Conseq. Safeguards Action
17
HazOps require discipline. The use of the guide word must be strictly followed.
Usually there is a moderator whose purpose is to keep the committee on task. As
we have seen in our discussions, it is easy to drift to other topics or explore other ideas.
In the context of the HazOp, this could lead to failure to identify the hazards in the
process and to evaluate the systems in place the control the hazard.
While is possible to apply HazOp to an entire process, it is typically applied to specific

areas which have been prescreened for potential hazards.
In our case, we will be focusing on issues such as inventory, toxicity, reactivity, pressure
and temperature. We will also be concerned with our control systems ability to keep the
process operating at intended conditions as the base case evolves.
Basically, we take a very small section of the process to focus on at one time. We select the
process parameter that we want to investigate and then select the menu of guide words
that we wish to study. We then successively fill in HazOp forms for each guide word
applied to each process parameter for each section of the plant that we might study. Finish
one guide word before going on to the next.
18
Example Problem
The reaction system shown below is exothermic. A cooling system is

provided to remove the excess energy of reaction. In the event the
cooling function is lost, the temperature of the reactor would increase.
This would lead to an increase in reaction rate leading to additional
energy release. The result could be a runaway reaction with pressures
exceeding the bursting pressures of the reactor.
19
Intent: Guide: Process Parameter:
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
20
Intent: Guide: Process Parameter:
21
Intent: Cooling Flow in Coils Guide: No Process Parameter: Cooling
No Cooling Plug in Line Temperature Increases None Temperature

Alarm
Blocked Line Possible Runaway
Relief Valve
Pipe Breaks Broken Coils due to
Block in CW Low Flow
CV Fails Alarm
Controller Fails Study of Water

Reactant
Interaction
Emergency
Shutdown
CW System Back up CW
Fails System
Air System Fail AFO Valve
Sewer Backs Up Filter on CW

22
HazOp
Hazard & Operability Studies will help us identify the principal

hazards in our plant. We can use this identification to invoke the
Inherent Safety Strategies reduce the hazards.
Remember, while HazOp’s identify hazards, they do not give insight

into the probability that they will escape and cause harm.
23
How will use Checklists
during your design evolution?
Checklists
Process Hazard Checklists
Another method to identify hazards is the process safety checklist. While the
literature calls this hazard identification, the use of ‘hazard’ in this context is
broader than the specific definition that I want us to use for Inherent Safety.
 This is a list of items that the reviewer needs to consider.

 This list contains itemizes problems and failures.
 The items on the list may or not apply to the situation.
 The list acts as a reminder to stimulate thought.
 The list can be used for:
Conceptual Design
Pilot Plant Operation
Detailed Design
Construction
Start up
Routine Operation
Modification/Expansion
Decommissioning
24
Checklists
The checklist reminds the reviewer or operator of potential

problem areas.
A check-off is required. For a checklist to be effective the reviewer

or operator must respond.
Further Study Requied

ACTION REQUIRED! Does Not Apply
Completed
All controls fail safe?
The following is an example from Crowl & Louvar. I have put in red the ones that
might be of interest to you during the development of your inherently safer base case.
25
Further Study Required
Does Not Apply
Completed
General Layout
1. Areas properly drained?

2. Aisle ways provided?
3. Fire walls, dikes and special guardrails needed?
4. Hazardous underground obstructions?
5. Hazardous overhead restrictions?
6. Emergency accesses and exits?
7. Enough headroom?
8. Access for emergency vehicles?
9. Safe storage space for raw materials and finished products?
10. Adequate platforms for safe maintenance operations?
11. Hoists and elevators properly designed and safeguarded?
12. Clearance for overhead power lines?
13.
14.
15.
26
Does Not Apply
Completed
Buildings
1. Adequate ladders, stairways and escape-ways?

2. Fire doors required?
3. Head obstructions marked?
4. Ventilation adequate?
5. Need for ladder or stairway to roof?
6. Safety glass specified where necessary?
7. Need for fireproofed structural steel?
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
27
Does Not Apply
Completed
Process
1. Consequences of exposure to adjacent operations considered?

2. Special fume or dust hoods required?
3. Unstable materials properly stored?
4. Process laboratory checked for runaway explosive conditions?
5. Provisions for protection from explosions?
6. Hazardous reactions possible due to mistakes or contamination?
7. Chemistry of processes completely understood and reviewed?
8. Provisions for rapid disposal of reactants in an emergency?
9. Failure of mechanical equipment possible cause of hazards?
10. Hazards possible from gradual or sudden blockages in piping?
11. Hazards possible from gradual or sudden blockages in equipment?
12. Public liability risks possible from sprays, fumes, mists or noise?
13. Provisions made for disposal of toxic materials?
14. Material safety data sheets available for all chemical species?
15. Hazards possible from simultaneous loss of two or more utilities?
28
Does Not Apply
Completed
Process (cont.)
16. Hazards involved in sewering materials?

17. Safety factors altered by design revisions?
18. Consequences of reasonably worst incident reviewed?
19. Consequences of combination of incidents reviewed?
20. Process diagrams correct and up-to-date?
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
29
Does Not Apply
Completed
Piping
1. Safety showers and eye baths required?

2. Sprinkler systems required?
3. Provisions for thermal expansion?
4. All overflow lines directed to safe areas?
5. Vent lines directed safely?
6. Piping specifications followed?
7. Washing-down hoses needed?
8. Check valves provided as needed?
9. Protection and identification of fragile pipe considered?
10. Possible deterioration of exterior of piping by chemicals?
11. Emergency valves readily accessible?
12. Long and large vent lines supported?
13. Steam condensate piping safely designed?
14. Relief valve piping designed to prevent plugging?
15. Drains to relieve pressure on suction and discharge of all process pumps?
30
Does Not Apply
Completed
Piping (cont.)
16. City water lines not connected to process pipes?

17. Flammable fluids feeding production units hut off from safe distance?
18. Personnel protective insulation provided?
19. Hot steam lines insulated?
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31
Does Not Apply
Completed
Equipment
1. Designs correct for maximum operating pressure?

2. Corrosion allowance considered?
3. Special isolation for hazardous equipment?
4. Guards for belts, pulleys, sheaves and gears?
5. Schedule for checking protective devices?
6. Dikes for any storage tanks?
7. Guard rails for storage tanks?
8. Construction materials compatible with process chemicals?
9. Reclaimed and replacement equipment checked structurally?
10. Reclaimed and replacement equipment checked for process pressures?
11. Pipelines independently supported to relieve pumps?
12. Pipelines independently supported to relieve other equipment?
13. Automatic lubrication of critical machinery?
14. Emergency standby equipment needed?
15.
32
Does Not Apply
Completed
Venting
1. Relief valves or rupture disks required?

2. Materials of construction corrosion resistant?
3. Vents properly designed? (Size, direction, configuration)
4. Flame arrestors required on vent lines?
5. Relief valves protected from plugging by rupture disks?
6. Telltale pressure gauges installed between rupture disk and relief valve?
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
33
Does Not Apply
Completed
Instrument and Electrical
1. All controls fail safe?

2. Dual indication of process variables necessary?
3. All equipment properly labeled?
4. Tubing runs protected?
5. Safeguards provided for process control when instrument out of service?
6. Process safety affected by response lag?
7. Labels for all start-stop switches?
8. Equipment designed to permit lockout protection?
9. Electrical failures cause unsafe conditions?
10. Sufficient lighting for both outside and inside operations?
11. Lights provided for all sight glasses, showers and eye-baths?
12. Breakers adequate for circuit protection?
13. All equipment grounded?
14. Special interlocks needed for safe operation?
15. Emergency standby power on lighting equipment required?
34
Does Not Apply
Completed
Instrument and Electrical (cont.)
16. Emergency escape lighting required during power failures?

17. All necessary communications equipment provided?
18. Emergency disconnect switches properly marked?
19. Special explosion proof electrical fixtures required?
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
35
Does Not Apply
Completed
Safety Equipment
1. Fire extinguishers required?

2. Special respiratory equipment required?
3. Diking material required?
4. Colorimetric indicator tubes required?
5. Flammable vapor detection apparatus required?
6. Fire extinguishing materials compatible with process materials?
7. Special emergency procedures and alarms required?
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
36
Does Not Apply
Completed
Raw Materials
1. Any materials and products require special handling equipment?

2. Any raw materials and products affected by extreme weather conditions?
3. Any products hazardous from a toxic or fire standpoint?
4. Proper containers being used?
5. Containers properly labeled for toxicity, flammability, stability, etc.?
6. Consequences of bad spills considered?
7. Special instructions needed for containers?
8. Special instructions needed for storage and warehousing distributors?
9. Does warehouse have operating instructions covering each product?
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
37
Checklists are not a substitute for a
more rigorous approach. However,
they can be a constant reminder
to reviewers of items to consider for
the situation at hand. They can be used
as a stimulant for more formal studies.
38

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Inherent Safety Structure

PROCESS HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Hazard and Operability Studies (HazOp)

Colin S. ‘Chip’ Howat Ph.D.

Kurata Thermodynamics Laboratory

Lecture: One to Two Class Periods

Title: Process Hazard Identification Using Hazard & Operability Studies

Thought: I don’t like work - no man does - but I like what is

Question: What are the implications of: ‘What you don’t

Purpose: Introduce hazard evaluation procedures and introduce

Objective: Synthesis and Evaluation

• Purpose of Hazard Evaluation

• Introduction to Risk Assessment

• Types of Hazard Identification Procedures

• Focus on Two Methods

Inherently Safer Processes Strategies

MINIMIZE Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances.

SUBSTITUTE Replace hazardous substances with a less hazardous ones.

MODERATE Use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous forms

SIMPLIFY Use less complexity.

‘A hazard is an inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the potential

We need to identify HAZARDS.

The Hazard Identification Methodology which is the

RISK = PROBABILITY * CONSEQUENCE

Identify the HAZARD

Evaluate the HAZARD

Reduce the HAZARD

Event Probability Event Consequence

Our emphasis in synthesis

The successful Hazard Evaluation program meets the following:

• The need for risk information has been met;

The selection of Hazard Evaluation program is based on the following:

• The type of information available, perceived risks, characteristics

• The resource availability and analyst/management preference

• Safety Review -- Qualitative descriptions of potential safety

(Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, p.77)

The previous slide indicates that the

The identification of toxicity, high pressure and high temperature

Hazard and Operability Analysis was developed to

The purpose is to carefully review a process or operation

The results are identified hazards and operability

We will be able to apply this method to our evolving

A HazOp Guide Word is combined with a Process Parameter to

Deviations from intended design/operation

Causes of those deviations

Identification Consequences of those deviations

Actions (recommendations) for design or

HazOp Studies do not provide insight into the probability or likelihood

No or Not The complete negation of the intention

Deviation Causes Conseq. Safeguards Action

While is possible to apply HazOp to an entire process, it is typically applied to specific

The reaction system shown below is exothermic. A cooling system is

No Cooling Plug in Line Temperature Increases None Temperature

Controller Fails Study of Water

Air System Fail AFO Valve

Sewer Backs Up Filter on CW

Hazard & Operability Studies will help us identify the principal

Remember, while HazOp’s identify hazards, they do not give insight

Process Hazard Checklists

 This is a list of items that the reviewer needs to consider.

The checklist reminds the reviewer or operator of potential

A check-off is required. For a checklist to be effective the reviewer

Further Study Requied