Professional Documents
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PRODUCED WATER
GAS
Feasibility Study
FEED
Detail Engg.
Basic Engineering:
Mass and Energy Balance Process Control Scheme PFDs and Basic Process P&IDs Sizing and Basic Spec. for Equipments and Instruments
Commissioning:
Pre-Commissioning Commissioning Startup and Feed charging Performance Guarantee test run
PLOT PLAN
PP
TQ EQ. LIST UHD UTILITY SUMMARY FLARE LOAD SUMMARY CHEMICAL SUMMARY HAZARDOUS SOURCE LIST REVISED P&ID BDEP LINE LIST PROCESS D/S FOR EQUIPMENTS UPDATED D/S FOR EQUIPMENTS UPDATED D/S FOR INSTRUMENTS PRECOMMISIONING MANUAL OPERATING MANUAL
TQ EQ. LIST UHD UTILITY SUMMARY FLARE LOAD SUMMARY CHEMICAL SUMMARY HAZARDOUS SOURCE LIST REVISED P&ID
CV EL
PE
BDEP LINE LIST PROCESS D/S FOR EQUIPMENTS UPDATED D/S FOR EQUIPMENTS UPDATED D/S FOR INSTRUMENTS PRECOMMISIONING MANUAL OPERATING MANUAL
PC
EQUIPMENT LIST UHD REVISED P&ID PROCESS D/S FOR MACHINERY ITEMS REVIEW & COMMENTS EQUIPMENT LIST UHD REVISED P&ID PROCESS D/S FOR EQUIPMENTS EQUIPMENT LIST UHD REVISED P&ID LINE LIST UPDATED D/S FOR INSTRUMENTS
ME
FABRICATION DWG.
EQ
IN
Preparation of TQs
Licensor P&ID
Equipment list
ISOMERISATION PROJECT
MUMBAI
(C)
DA- 317 02
DEPENTA NIZER
Tr ays , Distri butor Inte rna l b aff les, Vo rtex Bre aker,
KCS + 3 mm
TP 4 10
70
11 9
Int : 4 Ex t : FV
14 7 11 9
IH
80
PENEX UNIT
To p =1 .7 DA- 328 10 STA BILIZER 1 Bottom = 3 .2 TL -TL =26 .2 Tr ays , Distri butor Inte rna l b aff les, Vo rtex Bre aker, Int : 1 3.5 Ex t : FV 21 0 17 9
KCS+3 mm
TP 4 10
57
17 9
IH
12 0
DA- 328 11
LPG STRIPPER
0.75 x 21
Tr ays , Distri butor Inte rna l b aff les, Vo rtex Bre aker,
CS+3 mm
TP 4 10
45
60
Int : 1 3.5 Ex t : FV
12 0 60
COLUMNS
LNHT UNIT
Top = 2.0 DA-31701 STRIPPER 1 Bottom = 2.8 TL-TL = 27.9 Top = 3.2 DA-31702 DEPENTANIZER 1 Bottom = 4.0 TL-TL = 36.9 Trays, Distributor Internal baffles, Vortex Breaker, Int : 15.82 Ext : FV 232 171
KCS + 3 mm
TP 410
91
171
IH
125
KCS + 3 mm
TP 410
70
119
Int : 4 Ext : FV
147 119
IH
80
PENEX UNIT
Top =1.7 DA-32810 STABILIZER 1 Bottom = 3.2 TL-TL=26.2 Trays, Distributor Internal baffles, Vortex Breaker, Trays, Distributor Internal baffles, Vortex Breaker, KCS+3mm TP 410 57 179 Int : 13.5 Ext : FV 210 179 IH 120
DA-32811
LPG STRIPPER
0.75 x 21
CS+3mm
TP 410
45
60
120 60
Scope of supply
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
DMDS Caustic for LNHT reactor neutralisation Soda Ash (Na2CO3) Sodium Nitrate (NaNO3) Perchloroethylene (C2Cl4) Anhydrous Hydrochloric Acid (HCl) Make-up Caustic (NaOH) for Penex unit Anhydrous Ammonia
As a sulfiding agent during stat-up Required to neutraiize reactor effluent gases For preparing neutralizing solution during regeneration For preparing neutralizing solution during regeneration As a promotor for penex reactor catalyst Required during initial start up. Required for scrubbing of gases from stabiliser & during catalyst regeneration of naphta hydrotreating reactor. Required as corrosion inhibitor for LNHT unit
Catalyst Quantity
Sr.No. Equip. Tag No. Service Equip ID (mm) Type Bed Height (mm) Bulk Density 3 (Kg /m ) Type of Loading Bed (m3) Contingency 5% (m3)
Total quantity (m3) Total quantity (kg)
Manufacturer
DC-31701
Reactor
2500
3720
1065
Sock
18.3
0.915
19.215
20464.0
UOP
FA-32802
1800
ADS-11
2600
930
Sock
6.62
0.331
6.951
6464.4
UOP
DC-32801
2400
2480
520
Sock
11.2
0.56
11.76
6115.2
UOP
DC-32810
Methanator Reactor
1100
Puraspec 2443
7160
--
Sock
6.8
0.34
7.14
--
UOP
DC-32811
Penex Reactor
2900
9240
882
Dense
61
3.05
64.05
56492.1
UOP
DC-32812
Penex Reactor
2900
9240
882
Dense
61
3.05
64.05
56492.1
UOP
FA-32801A
1200
Puraspec 2020
3200
--
Sock
3.62
0.181
3.801
--
UOP
Battery Limit Tie-in Summary contains the following information for all ISBL & OSBL lines Flow rate of all process and utility streams going to B/L. Operating and Design Conditions Line Specifications Main Properties of the Streams (Optional)
HEADER
22 10 45 10.5 7 6 25
HEADER
HEADER
HEADER
HEADER
HEADER
HEADER
MUMBAI
PIPING CLASS
FLUID CODE
INSULATION TYPE
SR. NO.
LOCATION
UNIT NO.
LINE NO.
LINE NO.
FROM
10-P-3170001-A1A1
606
10
317
0001
A1A1
FA-31701
P-3170215
HC
6-P-3170002-A4A1
606
317
0002
A4A1
GA-31701A
P-3170046
HC
10-P-3170003-A1A1
606
10
317
0003
A1A1
P-3170001
P-3170216
HC
6-P-3170004-A4A1
606
317
0004
A4A1
GA-31701B
P-3170002
HC
0.75-P-3170005-A1A1
691
0.75
317
0005
A1A1
P-3170002
SN-31701
HC
0.75-P-3170006-A1A
691
0.75
317
0006
A1A
SN-31701
FLARE
HC
0.75-P-3170007-A4A1
691
0.75
317
0007
A4A1
SN-31701
P-3170001
HC
6-P-3170008-A4A1
606
317
0008
A4A1
P-3170002
FV-002
HC
6-P-3170009-A1A1
606
317
0009
A1A1
FV-002
FA-31701
HC
Updation of Pumps and Instruments datasheets based on Hydraulics Updation of Equipment list Development of Control and Safeguarding Narratives
Sizing of vessels is carried out based on Project Design Criteria (Droplet size, Residence time)
Sometimes, Sizing is governed by separation of fine entrained droplets using mesh pad, impact separators, etc.
FLUID QUANTITY DENSITY MW QUANTITY DENSITY PRESSURE TEMPERATURE NORMAL HOLD UP TIME LIQ. GAS / VAPOR
CODE / REGULATION SPECIAL SERVICE INSIDE DIAMETER TL-TL LENGTH INSIDE DIAMETER OF BOOT TL-TL LENGTH OF BOOT DESIGN PRESSURE DESIGN TEMPERATURE VACUUM CONDITION IF YES THEN INSULATION IF YES THEN TYPE HEAD TYPE DEMISTER IF YES THEN TYPE VORTEX BREAKER IF YES THEN TYPE CORROSION ALLOWANCE STEAM OUT CONDITION IF YES THEN STEAM PRESS. / TEMP. VESSEL TRIM
153
C 120 mm
mm
Licensor P&ID
Licensor Datasheet
This narrative describes the plant control systems by instrumentation. The purpose of this document are as follows : (1) To explain control systems to those who may not be familiar with instrumentation symbols or functional logic diagrams. (2) To define purpose and algorithm of each control system.
The purpose of this narrative is to thoroughly explain the safeguarding scheme and its significance. Based on the same it is possible to understand how safeguarding scheme works and how it will be depicted in Cause and Effect diagram or Safeguarding Matrix.
Effect Section
P-5105B HP STEAM VALVE P-51402A MP BFW PUMP P-51206A HP BFW PUMP P-51206B HP BFW PUMP P-51206C HP BFW PUMP P-51206D HP BFW PUMP P-5105A HP BFW PUMP P-51203 HP BFW PUMP DESCRIPTION ACTION TAG NO. 51LZA-2008 51LZA-2011 51LZA-2008 51LZA-2011 51LZA-2008 X X X X X X X X X 51LZA-2011
UNIT 51
Cause Section
CAUSE
CLOSE 51UZA-2103
TRIP 51UZA-2102
TRIP 51UZA-2104
TRIP 51UZA-2100
TRIP 51UZA-2105
TRIP 51UZA-2106
TRIP 51UZA-2107
TRIP 51UZA-2108
ALARM 51UZA-2100 X X X
TAG NO.
DESCRIPTION
PEFS NO.
<51HS-2012 is 'BOTH' position> 51LZA-2008 V-51203 LEVEL LOW LOW 51LZA-2011 V-51210 LEVEL LOW LOW D-0098-51-25-0006 D-1651-51-50-0018 X X X X X X X X
<51HS-2012 is 'V-51203' position> 51LZA-2008 V-51203 LEVEL LOW LOW 51LZA-2011 V-51210 LEVEL LOW LOW D-0098-51-25-0006 D-1651-51-50-0018 X X X X X X X X
<51HS-2012 is 'V-51210' position> 51LZA-2008 V-51203 LEVEL LOW LOW 51LZA-2011 V-51210 LEVEL LOW LOW D-0098-51-25-0006 D-1651-51-50-0018
Interface Activities Updation of Control & Safeguarding narratives and issue for HAZOP Study Updation of Utility summary Updation of Line list
Vendor Document Review Review of Engineering Drawings Review of Plot Plan 3D-Model Review Review of DCS Graphics
Some of the Critical points to be reviewed in Engineering Drawings are: Consistency of Process data as per process datasheets such as Operating & Design Conditions, MOC, Special service requirements, etc. Number of Nozzles Sizes of Nozzles Checking location and orientation of all nozzles especially nozzles for Temperature, Pressure and Level Instruments as per Project requirements
Updation of Control & Safeguarding narratives and issue for HAZOP Study Updation of Utility summary Updation of Line list
Safety Studies / Analysis Updation of P&IDs based on Safety Studies recommendation Preparation of Precommisioning manual Preparation of Operating manual
HAZard and OPerability study is a technique to examine a system, part by part, in a very systematic manner, to find out the cause and consequence of every conceivable deviation in the normal operation of the system as well as during emergencies, start-ups and shutdowns. The method enables prediction of all possible ways in which a hazard or an operating problem could arise, whether the design takes preventive care of them and if not,
The probability (likelihood) of a safety-related system performing the required safety function under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time
SIL is a measure of the reliability of the safety function
performing to specification.
The SIL is based on the accepted risk level and ranges from 1
to 4
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 4 3 2 1 Probability of Failure Mode of Operation On demand Mode of Operation continuous (average probability of failure to perform (probability of dangerous failure per its design function upon demand) hour) -5 -4 > 10 to < 10 > 10-9 to < 10-8 > 10-4 to < 10-3 > 10-8 to < 10-7 > 10-3 to < 10-2 > 10-7 to < 10-6 > 10-2 to < 10-1 > 10-6 to < 10-7
12.5
This level of radiation will cause a 30% chance of fatality for a prolonged exposure.
Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastic tubing Failure of steel structures within 30 minutes
37.5
Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment. Exposure to this level of radiation is assumed to give rise to a 100% chance of fatality
Area in red needs to be given extensive consideration for fire protection systems