You are on page 1of 95

The Truth Behind

the 2004 Elections


PART 2. Mechanics of Fraud : PCIB areas
THE VOTING
GARCI OPERATIONS
PROCESS
Precinct  Wholesale changes
in the COCs to
reverse results
such that FPJ's
City / Municipality votes were given to
GMA
 Discrepancies in
BY PRECINCT different election
result documents
Province
are obvious
PCIB OPERATIONS
 Pre-manufactured
ERs were BY MUNICIPALITY
Legend:
switched with
Congress
genuine
ERsERs as
– Election Returns
insurance votes
SOV – Statement of Votes
for GMA
COC
 Dagdag – Certificate
bawas is of Canvass 2
FIRST Mechanic
1 of Fraud
PAD THE NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS AND CREATE GHOST
PRECINCTS TO HIDE WHOLESALE
ADDITION OF VOTES RESULTING IN
STATISTICALLY IMPROBABLE VOTERS
TURNOUT.
NATIONWIDE INCREASE IN REGISTERED VOTERS
38.8M 43.5M

CLEAN-UP + 6.9M
OF VOTERS
LIST
FPJ
DECLARES
+ 4.2M + 4.2M CANDIDACY
NOV 27, 2003
+ 2.4M + 2.1M

1992 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004


July 2002 Mar 2004
- 0.1M - 0.045M FORECAST ACTUAL
Comelec
Project
4 of
- 2.9M Precincts
WHAT THE LAW SAYS :

Comelec Resolution 06-0060 dated


13 Feb 04 resolved to use 2002
registered voters data (forecast of
38.8M for 2004 elections) as basis
to start printing the official ballots.
WHAT THE LAW SAYS
RA 8189 “General Registration Act”
Sec 24. National Central File
“There shall be a national central file …
under the custody of the Commission …
consisting of all approved voter
registration records in each city or
municipality.”
Where is this National
Central File to show the
numbers of registered
voters in the provinces
and in fact, justify the 43.5
million registered voters
nationwide?
WHAT THE LAW SAYS
o t
n
RA 8189 General Registration Act
Sec 31 Sealing of Precinct Book of Voters
S
A !
“The Board shall notify within 15 days

e
before the start of the campaign period of
W n
all registered political parties and

i s o
members of the Board of Election

t h d
Inspectors to inspect and verify the
completeness of the voters’ registration
records for each precinct compiled in the
book of voters.”
2004 REGISTERED VOTERS : Forecast 2002 – Actual 2004

+
888,702
+
520,288

+
941,722

5,405,059 5,832,126
+ + 46,908
172,492 4,016,703
+ 78,484

+ 66,802 2,150,793 2,384,676


1,420,296
695,466

NCR CAR REGION 1 REGION 2 REGION 3 REGION 4 REGION 5

9
LUZON
2004 REGISTERED VOTERS : Forecast 2002 – Actual 2004

+
426,040 +
513,506

+
3,166,173 230,161
2,784,440
1,848,394

REGION 6 REGION 7 REGION 8

10
VISAYAS
2004 REGISTERED VOTERS : Forecast 2002 – Actual 2004

- 506,295

+ 50,489 + +
656,601 582,730
+ 93,670
2,640,710
- 33,790
1,568,662
1,410,508 1,284,809 1,069,472
1,129,231

REGION 9 REGION 10 REGION 11 REGION 12 CARAGA ARMM

11
MINDANAO
The PCIB Area consists of
Pampanga, Cebu, Iloilo and Bohol.
These provinces illustrate the extent
of padding of the voters' lists.

Iloilo
Pampanga Cebu

Bohol

12
Why the PCIB provinces?

• These provinces showed that Mrs.


Arroyo had a strong showing in
popularity ratings.
• The logic is to maximize her winning
margin in areas where she will win in
a clean and honest elections.

13
Pulse Asia in November 2003 shows:

• GMA received 39% support in the


Visayas, and 15%, her lowest, in
Metro Manila.
• Before the entry of FPJ in the
presidential race, GMA registered
highest support from the poorest E
class with 29%. From ABC class, she
got the lowest, 20%.
14
SWS Survey from September 2003
to March 2004 shows:

• GMA received +44% satisfactory


rating in the Visayas, and 11%,
her lowest, in Metro Manila.

15
2004 REGISTERED VOTERS : Forecast 2002 – Actual 2004

+ 136,695

1,080,751
944,092

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

PAMPANGA
16
2004 REGISTERED VOTERS : Forecast 2002 – Actual 2004

+ 481,096

1,780,708
1,299,612

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

CEBU PROVINCE
17
2004 REGISTERED VOTERS : Forecast 2002 – Actual 2004

+ 87,165

464,802
377,637

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

CEBU CITY
18
2004 REGISTERED VOTERS : Forecast 2002 – Actual 2004

+ 135,682

923,262
787,580

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

ILOILO PROVINCE
19
2004 REGISTERED VOTERS : Forecast 2002 – Actual 2004

+ 48,533

191,620 240,153

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

ILOILO CITY
20
2004 REGISTERED VOTERS : Forecast 2002 – Actual 2004

+ 62,560

619,139
556,579

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

BOHOL
21
2004 REGISTERED VOTERS : Forecast 2002 – Actual 2004

5,108,815

4,157,579 + 951,695

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

PCIB AREA
22
WHY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS?

BECAUSE PADDED VOTERS' LIST


LOWERS VOTERS' TURNOUT RATE.
PADDED VOTERS' LIST LOWERS
VOTERS' TURNOUT RATE

85% 74%
1,080,751
944,092
799,265 799,265

REGISTERED TOTAL REGISTERED TOTAL


VOTERS VOTES CAST VOTERS VOTES CAST

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

PAMPANGA
24
PADDED VOTERS' LIST LOWERS
VOTERS' TURNOUT RATE

93% 1,780,708
68%

1,299,612 1,208,810 1,208,810

REGISTERED TOTAL REGISTERED TOTAL


VOTERS VOTES CAST VOTERS VOTES CAST

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

CEBU PROVINCE 25
PADDED VOTERS' LIST LOWERS
VOTERS' TURNOUT RATE

87% 70%
377,637 464,802
327,672 327,672

REGISTERED TOTAL REGISTERED TOTAL


VOTERS VOTES CAST VOTERS VOTES CAST

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

CEBU CITY
26
PADDED VOTERS' LIST LOWERS
VOTERS' TURNOUT RATE

89% 76%
923,262
787,580
700,582 700,582

REGISTERED TOTAL REGISTERED TOTAL


VOTERS VOTES CAST VOTERS VOTES CAST

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

ILOILO PROVINCE
27
PADDED VOTERS' LIST LOWERS
VOTERS' TURNOUT RATE

91% 73%
240,153
191,620
174,326 174,326

REGISTERED TOTAL REGISTERED TOTAL


VOTERS VOTES CAST VOTERS VOTES CAST

2003 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

ILOILO CITY
28
PADDED VOTERS' LIST LOWERS
VOTERS' TURNOUT RATE

89% 80%
556,579 619,139
495,717 495,717

REGISTERED TOTAL REGISTERED TOTAL


VOTERS VOTES CAST VOTERS VOTES CAST

2004 ESTIMATE 2004 ACTUAL

BOHOL
29
• Aside from being padded,
voters lists were also juggled.
Padding results in addition of
favorable votes. Juggling leads
to the disenfranchisement of
legitimate voters and results in
subtraction of unfavorable
votes.
• Disenfranchisement is rampant
in opposition areas. 30
MASSIVE DISENFRANCHISEMENT -
VOTERS NAMES WERE NOT FOUND
IN THE PRECINCT LIST

• SWS EXIT POLLS 10 May 2004 :


"900,000 were not able to vote because
their names were not in the Voter's Lists"

• COMELEC estimated the


disenfranchisement at 900,000
MASSIVE DISENFRANCHISEMENT -
VOTERS NAMES WERE NOT FOUND
IN THE PRECINCT LIST
• NAMFREL 23 April 2004 :
"Disenfranchisement may have run as
high as two (2) million votes rather than
900,000 that exit polls suggested."
• OPPOSITION AND CIVIC GROUPS:
"… some three (3) million qualified
voters were not able to vote last May 10
2004 because of what they claimed was
a defective voter's list."
SECOND
2 Mechanic of Fraud
OVERPRINT EXTRA
BALLOTS AND SETS OF
ELECTION RETURNS TO BE
USED FOR ADDITIONAL
VOTES
WHAT THE LAW SAYS :

Comelec Resolution 06-0060 dated


13 Feb 04 resolved to approve the
quantity of forms for 250,000
clustered precincts plus 10%
contingency.
COMELEC PRINTED 59,000
ELECTION RETURNS MORE THAN
THE ACTUAL 216,000
CLUSTERED PRECINCTS.

Up to now, COMELEC has not


accounted for these extra ERs.
THIRD Mechanic
3 of Fraud
MANUFACTURE RESULTS TO
ENSURE VICTORY OF
FAVORED CANDIDATE
USING EXTRA BALLOTS AND
FORMS.
There were obvious and
undisputable material defects in
the PCIB election returns that
indicated tampering, alterations
and falsification.

This was also found in many


other areas in the country.

37
e d
Sec. 212 – Omnibus Election Code

a t
In the ERs, the tally of votes for
l
each candidate is closed by the

o
V i
signing of names, and affixing of
right thumb marks by all three
Board of Election Inspectors.
DEFECT NO. 1
Improper closing of vote tallies

• NAKED. No signatures and


thumbmarks of Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI)
• SEMI-NAKED. Incomplete BEI
signatures and thumbmarks.

39
Improper closing

40
DEFECT NO. 2
Non-thumbmark finger prints
• Small finger prints
• Non-finger prints
• Fingerprints with artistic designs

41
Small fingerprints / non-fingerprints

42
Fingerprints with artistic designs.

Sample scans
Non-thumbmark

43
Fingerprints with
artistic designs.

44
DEFECT NO. 3
Use of Unauthorized Fingerprint
Takers
• Using violet or red colored ink
• Using pen ink that leaves brown
residue at the back of the ER
• Using black paint that glitters when
hit by light

45
WHAT THE LAW SAYS :

Comelec Resolution 6667 Sec.15


states that each precinct shall
receive "two (2) thumbmark /
fingerprint takers" among other
forms and supplies. (The color of
these takers is grayish black.)
WHAT THE LAW SAYS :

Comelec Resolution 06-0060 dated


13 Feb 04 resolved to approve the
quantity of thumbmark takers of
500,000 pieces plus 10%
contingency.
Comelec Resolution 04-0286 16 Mar 2004
Procurement of Indelible Ink and Fingerprint Takers

“Approving the procurement of indelible


ink and fingerprint takers, two supplies
required by law to be used every election.”
“Two (2) pieces of fingerprint takers per
precinct, 250mm x 75mm, durable plastic is
clear form, good for 600 clear fingerprint
impressions.”
Use of blue “wet” ink.

“Sample scans:
Various ink samples”

49
This is the back of
the previous ER,
now with brownish
“Sample scans:
iron deposits.

Various ink samples”

50
Use of “black paint” type ink.
“Sample scans:
Various ink samples”

51
Use of “black paint” type ink.

52
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF
THESE MATERIAL DEFECTS
ON THE CANDIDATES’ VOTES?

53
MATERIAL DEFECTS IN PAMPANGA
ERs EXAMINED : 1,521
ERs WITH DEFECTS: 1,516 TOTAL DEFECTS : 1,923

49.3%
33.2%
17.5% 948
639
336
IMPROPER NON-THUMBMARK UNAUTHORIZED
TALLY CLOSING FINGER PRINTING FINGERPRINT INK
GMA PADDED VOTES
54
154,873
MATERIAL DEFECTS IN CEBU PROVINCE
ERs EXAMINED : 3,641
ERs WITH DEFECTS: 3,518 TOTAL DEFECTS : 4,639

42.3% 45.7%

1,962 2,118
12.1%
559
IMPROPER NON-THUMBMARK UNAUTHORIZED
TALLY CLOSING FINGER PRINTING FINGERPRINT INK

GMA PADDED VOTES


379,944 55
MATERIAL DEFECTS IN CEBU CITY
ERs EXAMINED : 1,733
ERs WITH DEFECTS: 1,653 TOTAL DEFECTS : 2,291

41.6%
35.5%
22.9%
814 953
524
IMPROPER NON-THUMBMARK UNAUTHORIZED
TALLY CLOSING FINGER PRINTING FINGERPRINT INK

GMA PADDED VOTES


110,751 56
MATERIAL DEFECTS IN ILOILO PROVINCE
ERs EXAMINED : 1,309
ERs WITH DEFECTS: 1,301 TOTAL DEFECTS : 2,025
54.4%
45.5%

1,101
860
3.2%
64
IMPROPER NON-THUMBMARK UNAUTHORIZED
TALLY CLOSING FINGER PRINTING FINGERPRINT INK

GMA PADDED VOTES


120,993 57
MATERIAL DEFECTS IN ILOILO CITY
TOTAL DEFECTS : 1,276

46.9%
38.7%

599
14.3% 494
183
IMPROPER NON-THUMBMARK UNAUTHORIZED
TALLY CLOSING FINGER PRINTING FINGERPRINT INK
ERs EXAMINED : 907
GMA PADDED VOTES
ERs WITH DEFECTS : 875
ERs WITH NONE : 32 54,250 58
MATERIAL DEFECTS IN BOHOL
ERs EXAMINED : 1,471
ERs WITH DEFECTS: 1,467 TOTAL DEFECTS : 2,230

47.4%
40.1%

1,058
12.5% 894
278
IMPROPER NON-THUMBMARK UNAUTHORIZED
TALLY CLOSING FINGER PRINTING FINGERPRINT INK

GMA PADDED VOTES


115,495 59
MATERIAL DEFECTS IN PCIB AREA
ERs EXAMINED : 10,582
ERs WITH DEFECTS: 10,330 TOTAL DEFECTS : 14,384

44.3% 42.2%

13.5% 6,377 6,063

1,944
IMPROPER NON-THUMBMARK UNAUTHORIZED
TALLY CLOSING FINGER PRINTING FINGERPRINT INK

GMA PADDED VOTES


936,306 60
WHAT THE LAW SAYS :
Comelec Resolution 6669 Sec. 26.
Material defects in election returns…

"If it should clearly appear that requisites in


form or data had been omitted in the election
returns…, the board of canvassers shall call
the board of election inspectors concerned to
effect the corrections."
In view of these massive
violations, and the inability to
institute any corrective measure,
the question is:
Are these just simple
coincidences or, unintended
neglect or deliberately planned?
WHAT THE LAW SAYS :

o t
n
Comelec Resolution 6669 Sec. 27.

S
"If the election returns… appear to be

A or were! prepared by
tampered with, altered or falsified… or
otherwise not authentic,
the BEI concerned, W
intimidation, or prepared n
under e
duress, force,

than the BEI,is the boardoof canvassers shall


by persons other

h copiesd
t
use the other of said election return."
WHAT THE LAW SAYS :
o t
Comelec Resolution 6669 Sec.
n 27.

with, altered or falsified,S


"If the other copies are likewise tampered

A or any! candidate
not authentic…
the board of canvassers
W
shall bring the matter to
n
theeattention of the
Commission."
i s o
t h d
CONSPIRACY OR
COVER-UP?
• At the level of the BEIs, why the deafening silence
of the teachers on the defective ERs?

• At the local canvassing levels, why the indifference


of the BOCs at the presence of defective ERs?

• At the Comelec level, why the defensive stance


when confronted with these material defects?

• At the national canvassing level, why the stubborn


refusal to hear any complaints on authenticity, due
execution and completeness of the ERs?
HOW CREDIBLE ARE
THE RESULTS?

Let us look at:


• Vote distribution
• Voters' preferences for local
favorite sons and daughters of
these provinces.
IMPROBABLE VOTE DISTRIBUTION
1,208,810
80%

10%
4% 3% 3%
TOTAL
GMA FPJ LACSON ROCO VILLANUEVA
VOTES

CEBU PROVINCE 67
IMPROBABLE VOTE DISTRIBUTION
799,265

80%

11%
2% 2% 4%
TOTAL
VOTES GMA FPJ LACSON ROCO VILLANUEVA

PAMPANGA 68
IMPROBABLE VOTE DISTRIBUTION
700,582

73%

12%
5% 6% 4%
TOTAL
GMA FPJ LACSON ROCO VILLANUEVA
VOTES
69
ILOILO PROVINCE
IMPROBABLE VOTE DISTRIBUTION
214,140
1. CARCAR
78% 2. MINGLANILIA
3. NAGA
4. SAN FERNANDO
5. SIBONGA
6. TALISAY CITY

11%
4% 4% 3%
TOTAL
GMA FPJ LACSON ROCO VILLANUEVA
VOTES

1ST DISTRICT, CEBU PROVINCE 70


IMPROBABLE VOTE DISTRIBUTION
225,148
1. ALCANTARA 1. DUMANHUG
85% 2. ALCOY 2. GINATILAN
3. ALEGRIA 3. MALABUYOC
4. ARGAO 4. MUAL BUAL
5. BADIAN 5. OSLOB
6. BOLJOON 6. RONDA
7. DALAGUETE 7. SAMBOAN
8. SANTANDER

8%
3% 3% 1%
TOTAL
GMA FPJ LACSON ROCO VILLANUEVA
VOTES

2ND DISTRICT, CEBU PROVINCE 71


IMPROBABLE VOTE DISTRIBUTION
240,600
84% 1. ALOGUISAN
2. ASTURIAS
3. BALAMBAN
4. BARILI
5. PINAMUNGAHAN
6. TUBURAN
7. TOLEDO CITY

8%
3% 3% 2%
TOTAL
GMA FPJ LACSON ROCO VILLANUEVA
VOTES

3RD DISTRICT, CEBU PROVINCE 72


IMPROBABLE VOTE DISTRIBUTION
228,611
1. BANTAYAN
83% 2. BOGO
3. DAAN BANTAYAN
4. MADRIDIJOS
5. MEDELLIN
6. SAN REMEGIO
7. SANTA FE
8. TABOGON
9. TABUELAN

7%
3% 4% 3%
TOTAL
GMA FPJ LACSON ROCO VILLANUEVA
VOTES

4TH DISTRICT, CEBU PROVINCE 73


IMPROBABLE VOTE DISTRIBUTION
250,711

81% 1. BORBON 6. PILAR


2. CARMEN • PORO
3. CATMON • SOGOD
4. COMPOSTELA 4. TUDELA
5. LILOAN 5. DANAO CITY

10%
4% 3% 2%
TOTAL
GMA FPJ LACSON ROCO VILLANUEVA
VOTES

5TH DISTRICT, CEBU PROVINCE 74


IMPROBABLE VOTE DISTRIBUTION
346,233

71% 1. CONSOLACION
2. CORDOVA
3. MANDAUE CITY
4. LAPU-LAPU CITY

15%
5% 5% 4%
TOTAL
GMA FPJ LACSON ROCO VILLANUEVA
VOTES

6TH DISTRICT, CEBU PROVINCE 75


VOTERS' PREFERENCE OF CEBUANOS

73% 80%
965,630
727,884

994,726 1,208,810

TOTAL VOTES VOTES TOTAL


VOTES CAST GARNERED GARNERED VOTES CAST

1998 OSMENA 2004 MACAPAGAL

CEBU PROVINCE 76
VOTERS' PREFERENCE OF CEBUANOS

58% 67%

220,060
175,468

305,018 327,869

TOTAL VOTES VOTES TOTAL


VOTES CAST GARNERED GARNERED VOTES CAST

1998 OSMENA 2004 MACAPAGAL

CEBU CITY 77
VOTERS' PREFERENCE OF ILONGGOS

56% 73%

512,812
317,032

567,962 700,528

TOTAL VOTES VOTES TOTAL


VOTES CAST GARNERED GARNERED VOTES CAST

1998 SANTIAGO 2004 MACAPAGAL

ILOILO PROVINCE 78
VOTERS' PREFERENCE OF ILONGGOS

45% 61%

105,597
71,478
157,369 174,326

TOTAL VOTES VOTES TOTAL


VOTES CAST GARNERED GARNERED VOTES CAST

1998 SANTIAGO 2004 MACAPAGAL

ILOILO CITY 79
FOURTH Mechanic
4 of Fraud

TAMPER WITH ELECTION


RESULT FORMS
CHANGING OF THE NUMBER
OF REGISTERED VOTERS IN
PAGE 7 OF CEBU PROVINCE
SOV
[Show scanned PSOV pages]

81
RE-STAMPING OF SERIAL
NUMBERS OF Page 1 of the
ELECTION RETURNS TO
CONFORM TO PRE-PLANNED
VOTE COUNTS

Uncovered initially 131 ERs (from


17 provinces and 4 NCR cities), 29
from PCIB area, giving GMA
11,921 insurance votes (minimum).
MANUFACTURING ERs WHERE
FPJ GOT ZERO VOTES

Uncovered initially 247 ERs (from


25 provinces including NCR), 65
ERs from the PCIB area with FPJ
getting ZERO votes and GMA
getting 26,335 votes.
MANUFACTURING ERs WHERE
GMA GOT ZERO VOTES

Uncovered initially 85 ERs (from


15 provinces including NCR) with
GMA getting ZERO votes and FPJ
getting 7,663 votes.

A deliberate cosmetic to provide a


sense of credibility for the results.
5 FIFTH Mechanic
of Fraud
SELECTIVE RESULTS TO
BE TRANSMITTED FOR
CANVASSING TO
MANIPULATE THE
OUTCOME.
BOHOL 996
ILOILO 1,115
QUEZON PROV 1,877
BUKIDNON 825 TOTAL
EASTERN SAMAR 447 = 6,883 Precincts
SARANGANI 446 at about
ANTIQUE 377 175 voters
ABRA 216 per
OTHERS 158 precinct -

1,204,525 votes were not transmitted


SLOW TRANSMISSION OF COC'S:

Far away locations were received


first than the Metro Manila
locations.
IMPACT OF THESE
MECHANICS OF FRAUD
• Voters Padded Lists or “GMA Vote Bank:
- Nationwide: 4.8 million voters
- PCIB area: 951,695 voters
• Disenfranchised voters due to juggling of voters lists:
from 900,000 to 3.0 million voters
• Material Defects of ERs from the PCIB area:
at least 936,306 GMA padded votes
• Unreported precincts whose votes were not counted:
Nationwide: about 1.2 million votes
Iloilo and Bohol: about 369,425 votes
88
THESE ARE MINIMUM AND CONSERVATIVE
ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF THE FRAUD
EXEMPLIFIED IN THE PCIB AREA.

BUT ALL INDICATIONS POINT TO THE MASSIVENESS


AND THE NATIONWIDE EXTENT OF THE PRE-
MEDITATED PLAN TO THWART THE WILL OF THE
ELECTORATE.

THESE ALSO SHOW THE DIFFICULTY OF


UNCOVERING AND DOCUMENTING THESE
FRAUDULENT MECHANICS AND THE RESULTING
IMPACT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE 2004 NATIONAL
ELECTIONS.
In summary, this study shows …
1. On the basis of tampered COCs, GMA won the 2004
elections.
+ 1,123,576

FPJ GMA
11,782,232 12,905,808 90
In summary, this study shows …
2. When the 951,695 padded PCIB votes are subtracted
from GMA, her lead is reduced
to 171, 881 + 1,123,576
171,881

FPJ GMA
11,782,232 11,954,113
12,905,808 91
In summary, this study shows …
3. When the 365,797 DAGDAG votes to GMA in 6
Mindanao provinces are subtracted, FPJ leads by
193,916 + 171,881

+ 193,916

FPJ GMA
11,782,232 11,954,113
11,588,316 92
In summary, this study shows …
4. . . . and the 295,944 BAWAS votes are returned to FPJ,
his lead increases to 489,860

+ 489,860
193,196

FPJ GMA
11,782,232
12,078,176 11,588,316 93
The true winner is
FERNANDO POE JR !
. . . and his lead does NOT even include VOTES SHAVED from
NCR and Regions 1 to 5, 9 to 12.

+ 489,860

FPJ GMA
12,078,176 11,588,316 94
END

95

You might also like