Game Theory In Telecommunications

Manzoor Ahmed Khan

(manzoor-ahmed.khan@dai-labor.de)
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 2
Game Theory
Game theory is a branch of mathematics. It was
first devised by John Von Neumann. It provides
tools for predicting what may happen when
stakeholders with conflicting interests interact.


11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 3
Introduction
Before we comment anymore on game theory lets
consider a soccer game.
A group of players playing against another group to
score goal(s)
Do all the players on a group have the same strategies?
The individual strategies of each player converges to attain
the objective of group.(why?)
How is soccer game different from a two player
game like squash?
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 4
Three basic components:
Players
Strategies
Payoff (preference relationship)
Lets now think of very basic players, strategies and
payoffs in telecommuncation.
Players (Nodes, Users, Operators, New/Handover calls)
Strategies (modulation scheme, amount of bandwidth,
transmit power etc)
Payoff( Revenue, QoS, Call admission, lower BER etc)
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 5
Game Theory
Does the decision of one player affect the
decision of other?
Lets consider a game, where a man(buyer) with
limited budget is to buy some groceries at a grocery
store, the decision of setting the price dervies the
selection of grocery item, meaning thereby payoff of
one player is dependent on the payoff of other
player..
Can you think of any such scenario in mobile
services. Suggest players and their payoffs?
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 6
Analogy of example in Telecom











Service Area
Provider 4






Provider 3






Provider 2






Provider 1





User Pool
Both Providers & Users can be modelled as
buyers / Grocery store.
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 7
Consider the figure, if you are to start
your journey at point s and terminate
at t and you are provided with two
routes.
What are the parameters that you evaluate to choose the
one of the two routes?

1. Distance
2. Others using the same route
Cost Function
Think of a similar scenario in Wireless Communication
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 8
A simple Game theory example
- It is a two player game (row palyer and column player)
- Player-1 chooses the row and player-2 chooses column
- The values in each cell represent utilities of players
- First number in the cell is utility of player-1
- Second number in the cell is utility of player-2
Prisonners Dilemma

C = Cooperator dont testify
D = Defect testify
Lets now mathematically define a strategic game.
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 9
Formal Game Definition
Normal form (strategic) game
a finite set N of players
a set strategies for each player
payoff function for each player
where is the set of strategies chosen
by all players
is a set of strategies chosen by players


) (s u
i
N i e
i
S
j N j
S S s
e
= e
N i e
S s e
9 S u
i
:
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 10
Common Games
Zero Sum Games
(1,-1) (-1,1)
(-1,1)

(1,-1)
They are true games of conflict, Any gain of my side
comes at the expense Of my opponents. E.g.
Matching pennies game. Player-1 gets a Euro from
Player-2 if both choose the same strategy or
otherwise loses a Euro
A couple wants to spend evening together, wife(P-1)
wants to go to Opera and husband(P-2) wants to go
football match

Battle of Sexes
(2 , 1) (0,0)
(0,0) (1,2)
Normal form game is one instance of repeated game played between
large populations of P-1s & P-2s
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 11
Dominated Strategy

4,3

5,1

6,2

2,1

8,4

3,6

3,0

9,6

2,8
L M R

T

M

B
Lets consider P-2
Is M better than R?
yes (R-dominated)
No (M-dominated)
Knowing this P-1 will ..
T dominated?
M dominated?
B dominated?

What do we observe?
Do we have a unique strategy profile that both players agree to play?
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 12
Nash Equilibrium
In the last slide we observed that Neither player has a unilateral
incentive to change its strategy (Nash Equilibrium)
In any strategic game given by


A strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrim, such that for
every player there exists
) , , (
i i
u S N G =
S s e *
N i e
) , ( ) , ( * * *
i i i i i i
s s u s s u

>
Few Natural Questions:
1. Do Nash Equilibrium always Exist?
2. Are Nash Equilibrium unique?
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 13
Solving the Game (min-max algorithm)
choose minimum entry in each
row
choose the maximum among
these
this is maximin value

A B C D
A 4 3 2 5
B -10 2 0 -1
C 7 5 1 3
D 0 8 -4 -5
Player 1
Player 2
2
-10
1
-5
7 8 2 5
choose maximum entry in each
column
choose the minimum among
these
this is the minimax value

if minimax == maximin, then this is the Nash point of game
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 14
Multiple Nash Equilibriums
A B C D
A 3 2 2 5
B 2 -10 0 -1
C 5 2 2 3
D 8 0 -4 -5
Player 1
Player 2
2
-10
2
-5
8 2 2 5
In general, game can have multiple saddle points
Same payoff in every Nash strategy
unique value of the game
Strategies are interchangeable
Example: strategies (A, B) and (C, C) are Nash Strategies
then (A, C) and (C, B) are also Nash Strategies
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 15
Cooperative Games
In cooperative games coalitions are formed among the players
and all the players then strive to increase the payoff of
coalition. Coalition represents an agreement between players
in the set coalition.
The Coalition value in quantifies the worth of coalition in a
game. A coalition game is defined as

The most common form of coalition game is characteristic
form, whereby the value of coalition depends on members of
that coalition with no dependence how the players of set other
than coaltion is structured. The characteristic function of
coalition quantifies the gain of S.
The characteristic function of empty coalition is zero and
satisfy the superadditive property.

) , ( v N
) ( ) ( ) ( T U S v T v S v < +
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 16
Core
The solution to coalition games is core
Given a grand coalition N, a payoff verctor
for dividing is a group rational if . A
vector is individually rational if every player can
obtain a benefit no less than acting alone i.e.
An imputation is payoff vector satisfying the above
two conditions. Thus core is defined as
R xe
) (N v

e
=
N i
i
N v x ) (
}) ({i v x
i
>

e e
> = =
S i
i
N i
i Tu
S v x N v x x c )} ( ), ( : {
Go through TU, NTU cooperative games
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 17
Bargaing Problems
Bargaining problems refer to the negotiation
process (which is modeled using game theory
tools) to resolve the conflict that occurs when
there are more than one course of actions for all
the players in a situation, where players involved
in the games may try to resolve the conflict by
committing themselves voluntarily to a course of
action that is beneficial to all of them.
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 18
Definition & Axioms
Bargaining problem is modelled as as pair (F; d), where
F represents theset of all feasible utility pairs and d is
the disagreement point. Players will not form coalition
if the utility that they receive is lesser than disagreement
point. The most common solutions that exist for
bargaining solutions include Nash Bargaining solutions,
Kalai-smorodinsky bargaining solutions etc. All such
solutions have to satisfy few axioms namely
i) individual rationality ii) pareto optimality
iii) independence of irrelevent alternative / individual
monotonicity iv) Symmetry.
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 19
Application Of Game Theory
Application of Bargaining theory to the problem
of resource allocation and call admission in
heterogeneous wireless network in our
contributed works.
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 20
Game Theory
A form of mathematics which attempts to
predict behavior in any sort of "strategic"
environment
It develops proveable solution concepts for
negotiating in situation of conflict of interests.

For more on GAME THEORY
Kindly watch the Movie
The Beautiful Mind.

11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 21
Bargaining
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 22
Online Bargaining
Bargaining turns out to
be a daily activity in
most areas.
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 23
Bargaining
Players will gain if they agree on a solution,
otherwise they will go back to their status quo.
Different solutions have been proposed for bargaining
problems e.g. Nash Bargaining solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky
(varient of Nash)

11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 24
Bargaining Problem
d
1
d
2
S
U
1
(x)
U
2
(x)
Bargaining Problem = (S, d)
S = feasible set
d = disagreement point
Which value is the correct solution
in Feasibility set..
Convex and Compact
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 25
Axioms of Bargaining Solution
1. Pareto Optimal
A solution is pareto optimal if it is not possible to find another solution
that leads to a strictly superior advantage for all players simultaneously
U
1
(x)
U
2
(x)
S
S
1
S
2
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 26
Axioms of Bargaining Solution
1. Pareto Optimal
2. Affine Transformation
3. Symmetry
4. Indedependence of Irrelevant Alternatives
4. Individual Monotonicity
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 27
Bankruptcy
where C = (c
1
,,c
n
)

=
s s
n
i
i
c E
1
0
1.
General Bankruptcy
(E, C)
) ( ) ( 0 q b q r
a w
w
a
p
e
s s
E = Requested Bandwidth
C = Pre-defined offered bandwidth by
Acc. Tech
Our Bankruptcy Equ.
E x
n
i
i
=

=1
Given that
i
c E s s 0
2.
(where x = allocation)
) (
1
*
q r x
a
p
n
i
i
=

=
(where x* = allocation)
)) ( ), ( ( q B q r
a a
p
Question.
How should the resource be allocated??
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 28
Resource Bankruptcy as Bargaining
To define bargaining problem
associated with bankruptcy
problem, we define a convex and
compact feasibility set for resource
allocation problem.
The disagreement point in our problem formuation is
influenced by cooperation among different access
technologies belonging to one operator.
)} ( ), ( | { )) ( ), ( ( q r x a B x x q B q r S
a
p
W w
a
w
a a n a a a
p
s s 9 e =

e
+
Disagreement Point = 0
) 0 )), ( ), ( (( q B q r S
a a
p
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 29
Bargaining Problem
) ( )) ( ), ( ((
) (
Pr
q q B q r F
a
W W w
a a
p
e
=

e
e
=
A a
a
p
W W w
q r q
a
) ( ) (
) (

0-associated Bargaining problem
Proportional Distribution Rule
[Proof ommitted]
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 30
) (q b
a
WiMAX
UMTS
WLAN
a
1
a
4
a
2
a
3
Bandwidth Request
WLAN
WiMAX
UMTS
) (q b
a
) (q b
a
) (q b
a
) (q b
a
) (q b
a
) (q b
a
Allocation w.r.t Pre-defined offered
bandwidth??
Any access technology getting
into congestion will not be able
to offer predefined offered
bandwidth.
=
So we define the term Offered BW
Offered BW Pre-defined Offered BW
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 31
Offered Bandwidth
WiMAX
WLAN
UMTS
) (q
w

Offered BW = Scaled by Loadsharing

e
a
w
C
c
=
e =
) 1 )( (


e
q b
a
W k
k
where
Offered BW = Tuned by congestion factor ,therefore =
+
w w
w
l C
l
) (q b
w
= ) (q
w

11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 32

Offered Bandwidth
where
|
is proportionate factor
| | ) ( ) ( q q r X
w p
a
w
| =
So the allocation is.
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 33
Putting things together
| | ) ( ) ( q q r X
w p
a
w
| =
) (
) (
q B
q r
a
p
0 >
a
W
a
p
C
q r ) (
if
otherwise
) (q b
w
a
W we
e
a
w
C
c
if
a
W we if
) (q
w

a
w
c 0 =
a
W
if
=
|
=
e
) 1 )( (

e
+
q b
e
a
w w
w
W k
k
l C
l

=
=
WiMAX
UMTS
WLAN
a
1
a
4
a
2
a
3
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 34
CAC, Mobility Algorithms
| | ) (q r X
p
a
w
) (q r
p
| | ) (q r X
p
a a
c o

) (q r
p
s
) (
) (
q
a
W W w
w
e

=
0
Otherwise
) (q r
p
| | ) ( ) ( ) ( q r X t c s t c
p
a a
w
a
w
o o o
+ = +
=
s ) (q r
c
a
p
) (
) (
q
a
W W w

e

If
0
Otherwise
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 35
Simulation Scenario
- Area a
1
is considered here.
-Calls for different applications
generated using poisson
distribution with mean 7
-Call holding time: infinite
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 36
Mobility simulation
-Simulated for Mobility between areas

11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 37
Comparison
-Our approach compared
against the different approaches
e.g. Best Fit, Worst Fit etc.
[comparison paper
D. Mariz, I. Cananea, D. Sadok,
and G. Fodor, Simulative analysis
of access selection algorithms for
multi-access networks,]
11.03.2012 CC NEMO - Network & Mobility Slide 38


Thanks