Two distinct functions for biometric devices:

Positive Identification
To prove you are who you say you are.

Negative Identification
To prove you are not who you say you are

not.

Types of Biometrics

Face recognition Iris scanning Retina scanning Fingerprinting Hand geometry Voice recognition Signature verification Keystroke Dynamics
Source: www.hsme.memphi s.edu

Types of Biometrics
o

Currently in Vogue o Iris o Thumbprint o Hand Geometry o Voice o Face Special Case o DNA

Promised o Body Odour o Multi-Attribute

Source: www.hsme.memphi s.edu

BIOMETRIC PROCESS
ENROLLMENT
Present Biometric Capture Process
STORE

NO MATCH

VERIFICATION
Present Biometric Capture Process

COMPARE

MATCH

Circumstances of Acquisition especially of the Test-Measure

Physically Supervised

Control-Points Closed Spaces Open Spaces

Remote

At Individual Devices Over Closed Networks Over Open Networks

Fingerprint Patterns

6 classes of patterns

Fingerprint Patterns

Minutiae
Crossover: two ridges

cross each other Core: center Bifurcation: ridge separates Ridge ending: end point Island: small ridge b/w 2 spaces Delta: space between ridges Pore: human pore

Fingerprint Patterns

Two main technologies used to capture image of the fingerprint

Optical use light refracted through a prism Capacitive-based detect voltage changes

in skin between ridges and valleys

Advanced Minutiae Based AlgoRITHM

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Developed by Suprema Solutions
Two processes Feature Extractor Matcher

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Feature Extractor
Core of fingerprint technology
Capture and enhance image Remove noise by using noise reduction

algorithm Processes image and determines minutiae

Most common are ridge endings and points of

bifurcation 30-60 minutia

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Feature Extractor
Capture Image Enhance Ridge Extract Minutiae

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Coherence caluculation

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Feature Extraction

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Feature Extractor
applications
Points of bifurcation Ridge endings

Most frequently used minutiae in

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Feature Extractor
Minutiae Coordinate and Angle are calculated
Core is used as center of reference (0,0)

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Minutiae Extraction

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Matcher
Used to match fingerprint Trade-off between speed and performance Group minutiae and categorize by type
Large number of certain type can result in faster searches

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

Minutiae Matching Let T and I be the representation of the template and input fingerprint, respectively. Let the minutiae sets of the two fingerprints be given by:

A minutia mj in I and a minutia mi in T are considered to be matched if their spatial and orientation differences are within specified thresholds ro and o.

Advanced Minutiae Based Algorithm

The matching algorithm returns a percentage match score, which is then used to take the match-no match decision based on the security criterion.

Identification vs. Authentication

Identification Who are you?

1 : N comparison Slower Scan all templates in

database

Authentication Are you John Smith?

1 : 1 comparison Faster Scan one template

Security

Accuracy
97% will return correct results
100% deny intruders

Image
Minutiae is retrieved and template created Encrypted data Image is discarded Cannot reconstruct the fingerprint from data

Comparision
Method Iris Recognition Fingerprinting Hand Shape Coded Pattern Iris pattern Fingerprints Size, length and thickness of hands

Misidentification Security Applications rate

1/1,200,000 1/1,000 1/700 1/100 1/100 1/30 High Medium Low Low Low Low High-security facilities Universal Low-security facilities

Outline, shape and Facial distribution of eyes and Recognition nose Signature Shape of letters, writing order, pen pressure

Low-security facilities
Low-security facilities Telephone service

Voice printing Voice characteristics

Overview of Biometrics
Biometric Iris Acquisition Device Infrared-enabled video camera, PC camera Desktop peripheral, PC card, mouse chip or reader embedded in keyboard Microphone, telephone Sample Black and white iris image Feature Extracted Furrows and striations of iris Location and direction of ridge endings and bifurcations on fingerprint, minutiae Fingerprint Fingerprint image (optical, silicon, ultrasound or touchless)

Voice

Voice Recording

Frequency, cadence and duration of vocal pattern Speed, stroke order, pressure and appearance of signature Relative position and shape of nose, position of cheekbones Height and width of bones and joints in hands and fingers Blood vessel patterns and retina

Signature

Signature Tablet, Motion-sensitive stylus Video Camera, PC camera, singleimage camera Proprietary Wallmounted unit

Image of Signature and record of related dynamics measurement Facial image (optical or thermal)

Face

Hand

3-D image of top and sides of hand

Retina

Proprietary desktop or wall mountable unit

Retina Image

Biometric
Iris

Strengths, Weaknesses and Usability of BiometricsUsability Strengths Weakness

Very stable over time Uniqueness Potential user resistance Requires user training Dependant on a single vendors technology Information security access control, especially for Federal Institutions and government agencies Physical access control (FIs and government) Kiosks (ATMs and airline tickets) IS access control Physical access control Automotive

Fingerprint

Most mature biometric technology Accepted reliability Many vendors Small template (less than 500 bytes) Small sensors that can be built into mice, keyboards or portable devices

Physical contact required (a problem in some cultures) Association with criminal justice Vendor incompatibility Hampered by temporary physical injury

Optical

Most proven over time Temperature stable

Large physical size Latent prints CCD coating erodes with age Durability unproven

Strengths, Weaknesses and Usability of Biometrics Usability Biometrics Strengths Weakness

Silicon Small physical size Cost is declining Requires careful enrollment Unproven in sub optimal conditions New technology, few implementations Unproven long term performance Unstable over time Changes with time, illness stress or injury Different microphones generate different samples Large template unsuitable for recognition Unstable over time Occasional erratic variability Changes with illness, stress or injury Mobile phones Telephone banking and other automated call centers Ultrasoun d Most accurate in sub optimal conditions

Voice

Good user acceptance Low training Microphone can be built into PC or mobile device

Signatures

High user acceptance Minimal training

Portable devices with stylus input Applications where a wet signature ordinarily would be

Strengths, Weaknesses and Usability of Biometrics Usability Biometrics Strengths Weakness

Face Universally present Hand Retina Small template (approximately 10 bytes) Low failure to enroll rate Unaffected by skin condition Stable over time Uniqueness Cannot distinguish identical siblings Religious or cultural prohibitions Physical size of acquisition device Physical contact required Juvenile finger growth Hampered by temporary physical injury Requires user training and cooperation High user resistance Slow read time Dependent on a single vendors technology Physical access control

Physical access control Time and attendance

IS access control, especially for high security government agencies Physical access control (same as IS access control)

Biometrics Comparison

Face recognition Retina scanning Iris scanning Voice recognition Hand geometry Fingerprinting Accuracy Intrusiveness

Cost

Conventional Measures of Quality

Failure to Enrol Rate

FTE(R)

Failure to Acquire Rate

False Non-Match Rate False Match Rate

FTA(R)
FNMR FMR

False Accept Rate False Reject Rate

FAR FRR
ERR [sic]

Equal Error Rate (where FAR = FRR)

Authentication
Biometric systems can be hard to compare. Type I Error: False rejection rate. Type II Error: False acceptance rate.

This is an important error to avoid.

Crossover Error Rate

49

Type I Errors
A type I error (false rejection, false positive) is the decision error made by rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true One specifies the type I error rate, a, that one considers tolerable This error rate is called the significance level By default, a is often taken to be 0.05

The Critical Value

In hypothesis testing, the critical value is the threshold value for the test statistic that is used to choose between the null and alternative hypotheses The term has been borrowed, with only a slight change in definition, to denote the threshold value to which a measured value is compared in the lab to make a detection decision

The Critical Value continued

The critical value is selected to limit the type I error probability to a There are many possible equations for it Choose one that is appropriate for your situation: One size does not fit all MARLAP does not prescribe any particular equation for the critical value

Type II Errors
A type II error (false acceptance, false negative) is the decision error made by failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is actually false The probability of a type II error depends on the amount of analyte in the sample Generally the type II error rate, b, goes down as the concentration of analyte goes up (more statistical power)

The hardest problem is the false alarms .... Suppose this magically effective face-recognition software is 99.99% accurate. That is, if someone is a terrorist, there is a 99.99% chance that the software indicates "terrorist," and if someone is not a terrorist, there is a 99.99% chance that the software indicates "non-terrorist." Assume that 1 in 10 million flyers, on average, is a [known!] terrorist. Is the system any good? No. It will generate 1000 false alarms for every 1 real terrorist. And every false alarm still means that all the security people go through all of their security procedures. Because the population of nonterrorists is so much larger than the number of terrorists, the test is useless.

What if its 95% accurate?

We get a 95% chance of finding the 1 [known] terrorist per 10 million passengers For people who are not [known] terrorists:

for 95%, the system gives a true negative for 5%, the system gives a false positive

Across 10 million passengers, there will be 500,000 false alarms That will delay people and planes, infuriate everyone, and result in the system being ignored most of the time

AN EXTRA LAYER OF SECURITY

The mathematical templates, if stolen, can be dangerous. IBM SOLUTION Now biometric fraud will become more sophisticated and problematic.