Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Gabriel Jimnez (Banco de Espaa) Jose A. Lopez (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco) Jess Saurina (Banco de Espaa)*
* The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Banco de Espaa, the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System.
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Outline
Introduction-Motivation
Contributions of the paper
Database
Empirical evidence
Event study Econometric modeling Data description Estimation results
Policy analysis
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Overview
Commitment
Exposure
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Overview (continued)
Academic research on corporate credit lines has been relatively limited, most probably due to a lack of data.
Melnik and Plaut (1986): 101 survey respondents
Ham and Melnik (1987): 90 survey respondents Berger & Udell (1995): 89 Nat. Survey of Small Bus. Fin.
Our dataset based on the Banco de Espaas credit register allows us to construct a comprehensive sample of firms (more than 200,000) over a long period of time (1985-2005)
FINANCIAL STABILITY DEPARTMENT
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Borrowers identified ex-ante as riskier, get less access to credit lines; analogous to Sufis profitability result.
Borrowers that have previously defaulted on loans, access their credit lines less, suggesting bank monitoring. Credit line usage has cyclical characteristics; i.e., use increases in recessions and declines in expansions.
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Exposure at default (EAD) exhibits procyclical behavior. To our knowledge, this is the first evidence on this point. Various loan characteristics lower EAD: Larger commitment size Longer maturities Collateral requirements With respect to the Basel II framework, EAD parameterization in the standard approach may be too low For the foundation approach, it seems appropriate. Not sufficient recognition of the procyclicality of EAD that could augment the expected procyclicality of capital
FINANCIAL STABILITY DEPARTMENT
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Banco de Espaa maintains a credit register known as the Central de Informacin de Riesgos or CIR. The CIR contains monthly loan-level information on all credits above a threshold of 6,000 granted by Spanish banking institutions (i.e., commercial banks, not-for-profit savings banks, credit cooperatives, etc.) since 1984 - hence, full census of Spanish corporate borrowing
The CIR contains detailed information on loan details: borrower name, industry, province of headquarters instrument type (i.e., commercial loan, etc.) maturity use of collateral total commitment & amount drawn default status
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Definition of default status in the CIR database: the borrower has loan payments overdue by more than 90 days, the legal definition of default in Spain, or it has been classified as a doubtful borrower by the originating bank (i.e., the lender itself believes there is a high probability of non-payment). Not a terminal state, so new loans can be granted. Useful data transformations are available: length of a banking relationship number of loans outstanding percent of a firms credit lines provided by a bank Important shortcomings: no pricing data (i.e., interest rates, fees, etc.) no covenant information
FINANCIAL STABILITY DEPARTMENT
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After applying our filtering procedures, We have a sample of 915,563 credit line-year observations corresponding to 352,328 new credit lines granted to 258,532 non-financial firms by 444 banks time period: Decembers from 1985 to 2005 Roughly 85% of the observations are individual credit lines held by a firm with a single bank, and the remaining 15% of the observations correspond to firms that hold more than one credit line with a bank. We examine the period from 1985 to 2005, which includes a deep recession around 1993, and two expansionary periods around the late 1980s - early 1990s and from 1997 onward.
FINANCIAL STABILITY DEPARTMENT
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Transform calendar time data into event time data For each of the 17 years in the sample for which it is possible, define it as year zero and trace usage ratios back to year -5 For defaulted firms, shows usage up to default point For non-defaulted firms, just shows usage history
% DRAWN Credit Lines
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it is the time to default for credit lines that default at t+, >0 two specifications discrete, dummy variables; i.e., it(-5) = 1 & rest = 0 continuous variable; i.e., it(-5) = -5 Firmjt is variables that controls for firm characteristics Bankkt is variables that control for bank characteristics GDPGt is real, annual growth rate in Spanish GDP RIRt is 3m real interbank interest rate (measure of funding) i is a fixed effect for the credit line, and it is an error term
FINANCIAL STABILITY DEPARTMENT
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Why include i ? - All credit line time-invariant characteristics, such as its maturity or collateral requirements, are included here. - The CIR has limited information on firm characteristics, and those effects not captured elsewhere go here.
What is Firmjt? - It is a measure of firm risk based just on the CIR, which is an indicator variable for whether the firm has ever defaulted on any CIR loan.
What is Bankkt? - A measure of bank risk based just on the CIR, which is non-performing loan ratio of the bank. - A measure of the size of the bank using the total share of the bank each year as a proxy.
FINANCIAL STABILITY DEPARTMENT
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Within-Groups No. observatios 904,542 Sample period 1985-2005 Dependant variable Ln_RDRAWNijkt Model 2 Coefficient t-ratio No. years from defaultit Firm riskjt Bank NPL ratiokt Bank Sharekt GDPGt RIRt Constant F-test (p-value) 2.761 -0.685 0.015 0.598 -0.043 0.231 -0.524 0.00 41.48 *** -8.13 *** 3.24 *** 4.79 *** -5.23 *** 43.07 *** -16.41 ***
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Panel data estimation technique: Within-groups estimation to address possible correlation between i and RHS variables Dependent variable is ln_RDRAWNijkt
RHS variables Firm risk Sign (-) Riskier firms draw down less; suggests bank monitoring Large banks more confident(?) Riskier banks are more lenient
(+) (+)
(-) (+)
Increase use in bad times High funding costs lead to increased use of credit lines
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Sign (+)
As a firm approaches default, it drawns down more heavily on its existing credit lines, even after controlling for CIR firm and lender characteristics as well as macroeconomic conditions. Recall that years to default is a negative variable.
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Where Xit is a variable of interest that may have a differential impact on the usage rate depending on a firms time to default. We use: maturity indicator equal to one if greater than one year collateral indicator commitment size (with the top 5% tail winsorized) Bank type since there was variation in non-performing loans at different points in the sample; see Salas and Saurina (2002, JFSR)
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Sign
Firm risk (-) -for a given time to default, lower quality borrowers draw less, suggesting banks monitor these firms more closely
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Empirical evidence Further estimation results (continued) Interacted variable Line characteristics: Sign
Commitment size (-) -for a given time to default, larger credit lines are drawn less, suggesting more bank monitoring Maturity (-) -for a given time to default, credit lines with longer maturities are drawn less, suggesting more bank monitoring Collateral indicator (-) -for a given time to default, credit lines with collateral are drawn less, suggesting more bank monitoring
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Empirical evidence Further estimation results (continued) Interacted variable Bank characteristics: Sign
Bank NPL ratio (+) -for a given time to default, credit lines by riskier banks are drawn more, suggesting less bank monitoring Bank share (+) -for a given time to default, credit lines by larger banks are drawn more, suggesting less bank monitoring Bank type -not statistically significant
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Macroeconomic conditions:
GDP growth (-) -in recessions, credit line usage increases at any given time to default Our two sets of macroeconomic results are the first empirical evidence of the procyclicality of credit line usage (and related to the Gatev & Strahan (2006) work on credit line origination and pricing)
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Credit line usage is related to: macroeconomic conditions firm characteristics bank characteristics For firms that eventually default, credit line usage increases as the default approaches. These increases are influenced upward by bank riskiness and recessions downward by firm riskiness, loan terms and expansions
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Much work has been done on PD quantification and validation. Much less work has been done on LGD.
Virtually no work has been done on EAD, even though it has a one-for-one effect on capital requirements.
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Policy analysis Prior research on EAD Prior public research into EAD has focused on other forms.
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Asarnow and Marker (1995, the Citi study): presented (in an appendix) a set of LEQ estimates based on corporate loan data from 1988 to 1993 Araten and Jacobs (2001, the Chase study): based on 408 credit lines to 399 defaulted borrowers (i.e., no longer able to draw down) from 1994 to 2000
Unconditional LEQ of 43.4% i.e., borrowers that default draw down almost half of their undrawn commitment on their way down LEQit() is a decreasing function of i.e., borrowers draw down more as they get closer to default
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Based on 8,384 defaulted credit line-year observations corresponding to 2,883 credit lines LEQit() declines from 73% at = -5 to 36% at = -1 with an unconditional mean of 48%
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Further analysis based on different characteristics: Large credit lines have lower LEQs One interpretation is that larger lines are more actively monitored by lenders Another is that larger lines are granted to larger firms that dont need bank financing as much, even in default Credit lines with shorter maturities have higher LEQs One interpretation is that longer maturities allow for better monitoring of the borrower Collateralized credit lines have lower LEQs Not surprising since a drawdown puts more collateral at risk to be seized by the lender
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